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In the last half of the 1990s, labor productivity growth rose in the U.S. and fell
almost everywhere in Europe. We document changes in both capital deepening and
multifactor productivity (MFP) growth in both the information and communication
technology (ICT) and non-ICT sectors. We view MFP growth in the ICT sector as
investment-speciﬁcp r o d u c t i v i t y( ISP) growth. We perform simulations suggested by
the data using a two-country DGE model with traded and nontraded goods. For ISP,
we consider level increases and persistent growth rate increases that are symmetric
across countries and allow for costs of adjusting capital-labor ratios that are higher
in one country because of structural diﬀerences. ISP increases generate investment
booms unless adjustment costs are too high. For MFP, we consider persistent growth
rate shocks that are asymmetric. When such MFP shocks aﬀect only traded goods
(as often assumed), movements in ‘international’ variables are qualitatively similar
to those in the data. However, when they also aﬀect nontraded goods (as suggested
by the data), movements in some of the variables are not. To obtain plausible results
for the growth rate shocks, it is necessary to assume slow recognition.
JEL Classiﬁcations: D83, F43, O41
Keywords: Technology Shocks, DGE models, Learning1 Introduction
Changes in labor productivity growth in the U.S. and Europe are among the major
economic events of the last ﬁfteen years. There now seems to be general agreement
that in the last half of the 1990s, labor productivity growth rose in the U.S. and
fell almost everywhere in Europe. In the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, U.S. growth was
signiﬁcantly below that in European countries, but in the second half the situation was
reversed in almost every case. Recently, several analysts have provided breakdowns
of changes in labor productivity growth by country, by component, and by sector.1
Some generalizations are suggested by the data. In both the U.S. and Europe
there were increases in multifactor productivity (MFP) growth in the information
and communication technology (ICT) sector. It came as a surprise to us that these
increases were the same or even greater in Europe. As a consequence, there were
sharp reductions in the relative prices of ICT goods.2 At least partly for this reason,
capital deepening through investment in information and communication technology
(ICT)g o o d si n c r e a s e di nb o t ht h eU . S .a n dE u r o p e ,b u tt h ei n c r e a s ew a sa b o u tt w i c e
as great in the U.S. We treat MFP growth in the ICT sector as investment-speciﬁc
productivity (ISP) growth, a convention adopted by several others.3
MFP growth in the non-ICT-producing sector rose by a signiﬁcant amount in
the U.S. and by comparable amounts in some European countries but fell by more
than double these amounts in other European countries. Capital deepening through
investment in non-ICT goods increased markedly in the U.S. but decreased in Europe.
Increases in both labor productivity growth and MFP growth have been higher in
the U.S. in important sectors that produce mostly nontraded goods.
The changes in relative productivity growth rates in the last half of the 1990s were
accompanied by some dramatic changes in other variables. In the U.S., there was an
investment boom, a deterioration in the trade account, a temporary improvement in
the terms of trade, and a signiﬁcant real appreciation of the dollar.
In an attempt to provide perspective on the data, we perform simulations using a
DGE model with two countries (Home and Foreign).4 Each country produces a traded
good and a nontraded good, and the two traded goods are imperfect substitutes for
each other.5 In each country, consumption and investment goods are aggregates
1Most of our data come from three sources: the Groningen Growth and Development Center, Dale
Jorgenson and his associates, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
2To be more precise, what happened in the last half of the 1990s was an increase in the rate of
decline of the relative price of investment goods.
3See, for example, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997).
4Pioneering contributions to the analysis of productivity shocks in open-economy DGE models
include Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994b), Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994a), Stockman
and Tesar (1995), Baxter and Crucini (1995), and Kollmann (1998). Recent contributions include
Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2002), Laxton and Pesenti (2003), and Hunt and Rebucci (2003). Closed
economy contributions include Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2003, 2004).
5Nontraded goods are clearly a large fraction of output in the U.S. (and Europe). The (increas-
ingly unsatisfactory) convention of indentifying goods as traded and services as nontraded leads to
the conclusion that 75% or so of output is nontraded. Taking account of the familiar argument that
some services are traded, we assume that nontraded goods constitute 63% of consumption and 52%
investment. These ﬁgures are in the middle of the (admittedly large) range of assumptions in the
1assembled using the two traded goods and the local nontraded good. The baskets of
traded goods used in both consumption and investment are biased toward the locally-
produced good, but the ‘local bias’ in consumption is greater. The model nests most
two-country DGE models used over the past ﬁfteen years to analyze productivity
changes.
Our reading of the disparate productivity-growth experiences of the U.S. and
Europe has determined our choice of simulation experiments. We focus primarily
on two persistent productivity growth shocks. The ﬁrst is a symmetric ISP growth
shock. This shock has diﬀerent eﬀects on the two countries because one of them has
less structural rigidity reﬂected in lower costs of adjusting capital-labor (K-L)r a t i o s .
The second is an MFP growth shock that is (perfectly) asymmetric across countries.
Departing from much previous analysis, we emphasize the case in which the shock
aﬀects both the traded and nontraded sectors. To take account of slow adjustment of
consumption and slow recognition of persistent growth shocks, we incorporate habit
in consumption and learning about shocks. To ﬁx ideas, we consider symmetric ISP
level shocks before discussing the two growth shocks.
We calibrate the symmetric ISP growth shock so that it causes an increase in
the rate of decline of the relative price of investment that closely matches the one in
U.S. data. In the country with low K-L adjustment costs, the investment incentive
of the shock is large relative to the wealth eﬀect. As a result, there is an investment
boom, an actual reduction in consumption for several periods, and a modest trade
deﬁcit. In contrast, in the country with high K-L adjustment costs, the wealth eﬀect
dominates: investment increases very little, but consumption rises signiﬁcantly. The
movements in the TOT and the RER are qualitatively quite diﬀerent from those in
the data.
We calibrate the asymmetric MFP growth shock so that for the country receiv-
ing the increase, the initial rise in labor productivity growth is the same as for the
symmetric ISP shock. With MFP shocks, the wealth eﬀect is large relative to the
investment incentive. For positive shocks, both consumption and investment rise, and
there is a sizeable trade deﬁcit. The large wealth eﬀect combined with local-good bias
keeps the TOT from deteriorating for a while since demand for the local traded good
increases by as much as supply.
In succeeding sections, we present data relevant for analyzing productivity shocks
in the U.S. and Europe, our model, our simulations, and our conclusions.
2D a t a
2.1 Accounting for Changes in Labor Productivity Growth
Much progress has been made in accounting for changes in labor productivity growth
in the U.S. and Europe during the 1990s.6 It is no easy task to separate out the contri-
literature.
6In this paper we do not attempt to explain why labor productivity growth was higher in Europe
for many years before 1995 or to compare the levels of labor productivity in the U.S. and Europe.
2butions of capital deepening and multi-factor productivity growth for the economy as
a whole and for individual sectors.7 Data revisions and improvements in methodology
continue to have signiﬁcant eﬀects on conclusions.
Here we focus primarily on data from three sources: the Groningen Growth and
Development Center (GGDC), Dale Jorgenson and his associates, and the Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) STandard ANalysis data
base.8 Data from all three sources have at least three desirable features: they (1)
are reported on a standardized basis across several countries, (2) include estimates
of hours instead of only the number of employees for all countries, and (3) include
estimates of real investment that are quality adjusted using the same methodology.
Table 1 contains a comparison of GGDC and Jorgenson data for the U.S., France,
Germany, and the U.K.9 In addition, for the GGDC there are data for the Netherlands
and an aggregate called the ‘EU-4’ (France, Germany, the U.K., and the Netherlands).
For Jorgenson there are data for Italy but there is no aggregate of European countries.
In our comparisons we use average annual growth rates for the periods 1990-1995 and
1996-2001. We focus our attention on changes in average growth rates between the
two periods in the U.S. and European countries. Unless stated otherwise, growth rate
diﬀerences are presented in percentage point (pp) form.
Changes in U.S. growth rates are essentially the same in the data from the GGDC
and Jorgenson, and we will treat them as if they were the same in what follows.10
M o s to ft h em a j o rq u a l i t a t i v ef e a t u r e st h a tw ec h o o s et oe m p h a s i z ec a nb ei l l u s t r a t e d
by comparisons between the U.S. and the EU-4 aggregate in the GGDC data.11 In the
last half of the 1990s, labor productivity growth rose in the U.S. and fell in Europe
resulting in a diﬀerence between changes in growth rates of 1.5 pp. In the ﬁrst half of
the 1990s, U.S. labor productivity growth was signiﬁcantly below that in the EU-4,
but in the second half it was slightly above.
U s i n gt h es a m ed a t a ,t h ec h a n g e si nl a b o rp r o d u c t i v i t yc a nb eb r o k e nd o w ni n t o
changes in components. Overall capital deepening increased in the U.S.: there were
increases for both ICT capital (0.4 pp) and non-ICT capital (0.2 pp). In contrast,
overall capital deepening fell in the EU-4 because the increase in ICT capital deep-
ening (0.2 pp) was only half as much as in the U.S. and was more than oﬀset by the
decrease in non-ICT capital deepening (-0.6 pp). The contribution of MFP growth
increased in both the U.S. and the EU-4 but the U.S. increase was more than twice
as high (0.7 pp versus 0.3 pp).
The Jorgenson data include a breakdown of the contributions of MFP growth
into those from ICT-producing sectors and those from all other sectors. These data
7Some analysts also separate out a contribution of changes in labor quality, but in this paper we
abstract from such changes.
8Two GGDC sources are GGDC (2004) and Inklar, O’Mahony, Robinson, and Timmer (2003).
The work of Jorgenson and his associates is summarized in Jorgenson (2004). For the OECD STAN
data base source, see Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004).
9The GGDC data come from GGDC (2004) and the Jorgenson data come from Jorgenson (2004).
10The possible exceptions to this statement are the growth rates for labor quality which are not
considered in this paper.
11In the GGDC data, France is the only country where the qualitative pattern is diﬀerent from
that in the EU-4 aggregate.
3conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings that there has been a signiﬁcant increase in the contribution
of MFP growth in ICT producing sector in the U.S. (0.3 pp).12 However, it came as
a surprise to us that they also imply that the contribution of this sector has been just
as high in the European countries. In the non-ICT sectors, MFP growth increased
by 0.4 pp in the U.S. and by slightly more in France and the U.K. but fell by 1.2 pp
in Italy and by even more in Germany.
There has been much interest in the sectoral breakdown of the changes in labor
productivity growth. Using OECD data on value added by sector in the U.S. (a re-
arrangement of BEA data) we constructed a sectoral breakdown of labor productivity
growth for the U.S. which is shown in the leftmost three columns of Table 2.13 It
appears that most of the pickup in aggregate growth was accounted for by three sec-
tors: Manufacturing (0.2 pp); Wholesale and Retail Trade; Restaurants and Hotels
(0.4 pp); and Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Business Services (0.2 pp).
Conceptually, sectoral contributions to changes in aggregate labor productivity
growth can be broken down into changes in capital deepening and changes in MFP
growth. As it turns out, it is diﬃcult to reach deﬁnitive conclusions about the relative
importance of these contributions. There is evidence that sectoral changes in ICT
capital deepening have been important. As an example, the data in Table 2 provide
some support for the view that the sectors that have made the largest sectoral contri-
butions are the ones with the biggest increases in investment in ICT goods. Sectoral
data for the ratio of nominal gross investment in ICT goods to nominal value added
are shown in the rightmost three columns of Table 2. The increases in this ratio for
Wholesale and Retail Trade as well as Finance, Insurance, Real Estate & Business
Sector Services are signiﬁcantly larger than for all of the other sectors (except Trans-
portation, Storage, and Communication). These are two of the three sectors that
made the largest contributions. However, even though Manufacturing is the third,
the increase in its ratio is on the low end. Furthermore, by far the largest increase in
the ratio occurred in the Transportation, Storage, and Communication sector, where
there was a negative contribution.
There is also evidence that sectoral changes in MFP growth have been impor-
tant. Inklar, O’Mahony, Robinson, and Timmer (2003) show that some of the sectors
that have made the largest contributions to the increase in the diﬀerence between
aggregate U.S. and EU-4 labor productivity growth are sectors in which increases in
the diﬀerence between MFP growth rates have also been high.14 According to their
data, for some of these sectors the increases in MFP growth were considerably more
important than the increases in ICT capital deepening.15 Three sectors which exhibit
both of these phenomena are (1) Electrical and Electronic Equipment; Instruments,
(2) Repairs and Wholesale Trade, and (3) Retail Trade.
We believe that the data clearly suggest at least three generalizations regarding
12See, for example, Oliner and Sichel (2000).
13The contributions in Table 2 are calculated using the standard methodology summarized in
equation A.43 on p. 145 of Schreyer (2001).
14See their Figure III.3.c. The analysis in Fernald and Ramnath (2004) also supports this conclu-
sion.
15See their Appendix Tables III.C.1 through III.C.6.
4the breakdown of the increase in the diﬀerence between U.S. and European labor
productivity growth rates. First, although MFP growth in the ICT sector was
roughly the same in the U.S. and Europe, there have been important increases in
diﬀerences between ICT capital deepening in both ICT-producing and non-ICT-
producing sectors. Second, MFP growth in the non-ICT-producing sectors increased
in the U.S. but fell on balance in Europe. Third, in contrast to what some might have
expected, there have been signiﬁcant increases in diﬀerentials in MFP growth rates
nontraded goods as well as for traded goods. We have taken these generalizations
into account in constructing the model that we use to shed light on recent experience.
2.2 More on the U.S. Economy in the 1990s
Some additional data for the U.S. economy relevant for analyzing the eﬀects of pro-
ductivity shocks are shown in Figure 1. In discussing ﬁgures, we use the convention
that, for example, ‘panel 4 of Figure 1’ is referred to simply as ‘F1.4’.
In the second half of the 1990s, the decline in prices of investment goods became
more rapid. In particular, the rate of decline in the price of aggregate investment
relative to GDP (F1.1) increased by 0.69 pp. A greater increase for consumer durables
and a smaller increase for private investment (by businesses) more than oﬀset the small
decline for government investment. For the subcategory of investment in equipment
and software, the increase was 1.28 pp.
A tl e a s tp a r t l yi nr e s p o n s et ot h i sm o r er a p i dr a t eo fp r i c ed e c l i n e ,t h e r ew a sa ni n -
vestment boom. The share of investment in GDP (broken line F1.4) rose throughout
this period from about 0.19 to about 0.22 . In contrast, the saving rate, the solid line,
climbed by 2 pp between 1995 and 1998 but fell back to slightly below its 1994 level
by the end of 2000. Since the fraction of GDP devoted to government spending was
fairly constant in the late 1990s, the continued increase in investment accompanied
by the reduction in savings implied a deterioration in the overall U.S. trade balance
(F1.5).
The increase in the nominal investment share does not fully capture the magnitude
of the investment boom because of the decline in prices of investment goods. To better
capture the relative magnitude of the changes in quality-adjusted real investment, we
plot the diﬀerence between the growth rates of chain-weighted real investment and
chain-weighted real GDP (F1.2). The diﬀerence between these two growth rates got
at least as high in the last half of the 1990s as in earlier booms and remained high
much longer. Furthermore, the drop in the diﬀerence in the recession of the early
2000s was signiﬁcantly less than in earlier recessions.
What is not shown in Figure 1 is that an overwhelming portion of growth in
investment can be attributed to outlays for ICT investment (information-processing
equipment and computer software); nominal outlays on these item were 9% of total
nominal investment in 1990 and 22% in 1999. Real outlays grew faster because
computer prices fell. The increase in ICT investment growth accounts for 60% of the
increase in all investment.16
16See, for example, Bosworth and Triplett (2000).
5There was an abrupt increase in U.S. labor productivity growth (F1.3) in the
second half of the 1990s.17
The overall U.S. trade balance as a ratio of GDP (F1.5, dotted line) deteriorated
rapidly in the last half of the 1990s. We are especially interested in a comparison
of the U.S. with Europe. The U.S. bilateral trade balance with the European Union
(solid line) worsened slightly. After improving for a while, the overall trade balance
for Europe (dashed line) fell below its initial level.
The U.S. terms of trade with the rest of the world (F1.6, dotted line) improved by
as much as 5% before giving back much of its gain by the end of the decade.18 The
dollar appreciated dramatically in real terms against the ‘rest of the world’ (dashed
line) and even more dramatically against the Euro (solid line).
It apparently took some time for government and private analysts to become
convinced that the increase in productivity growth was going to be persistent. Both
the Congressional Budget Oﬃce and the consensus of Blue Chip forecasters produce
ﬁve-year-ahead forecasts of real GDP growth. As reported by Erceg, Guerrieri, and
Gust (2002), these forecasts were virtually unchanged until the late 1990s and then
increased gradually.
3M o d e l
In our analysis of the eﬀects of diﬀerent productivity shocks, we use a DGE model
with two countries designated Home and Foreign which are mirror images of one
another. We describe the behavior of the representative Home agent.
3.1 Tastes








Period utility is a constant elasticity function of Vs which, in turn, depends on the
current consumption of the agent (Cs), lagged total consumption (Cs−1), and leisure
which is given by one minus labor (Ls):














That is, there is external habit in consumption. The agent also chooses holdings of a
single bond (B)d e n o m i n a t e di nt h eH o m et r a d e dg o o d( t h en u m e r a i r eg o o df o rt h e
m o d e l )a n dt r a d e di n t e r n a t i o n a l l y .
17The quarterly data shown come from the productivity release of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
It diﬀers from the data presented in Table 1 in that it excludes the government and farm sectors.
18The US/ROW terms of trade is the ratio of the U.S. import deﬂator to the U.S. export deﬂator.
We have not calculated a US/EURO terms of trade because there are no bilateral data for some
countries in the Euro Area. The U.S./ROW real exchange rate is the ratio of the U.S. CPI to the
trade-weighted sum of exchange-rate-adjusted CPIs for 25 major trading partners of the U.S.
63.2 Technology
Home technology comprises six sectors. First, there are two sectors in which traded
(T) goods and nontraded (N) goods are produced using identical Cobb-Douglas pro-






















where Kis and Lis are vectors containing current and lagged values and i = T,N.F o r
sector i,o u t p u t( Yis) is produced using sector-speciﬁc capital (Kis)a n dl a b o r( Lis).
The T and N sectors use all the labor that is supplied:
Ls = LTs+ LNs. (4)
There are MFP shocks (Xis)t h a tm a yd i ﬀer between the two sectors. For sector
i, there are quadratic adjustment costs (governed by ψKL) associated with changing
capital-labor ratios. Examples of such adjustment costs are training costs and costs
of satisfying regulations.
Next, there are two sectors in which capital stocks are accumulated. In each of
these sectors, yesterday’s sector-speciﬁc capital stock (Kis−1) and some of yesterday’s













where φ governs the costs of adjusting capital stocks.
Finally, there are two sectors in which goods are assembled into a consumption
good (Cs) and an investment good (Js). Cs is a constant elasticity of substitution

















and Js is a CES function of ‘quality-adjusted’ investment inputs of traded goods (ITs)
















where ITs is the ‘quality-adjusted’ input of traded goods deﬁned below. In assembly
sector i, where i = I,C, the parameters νi and 1/θiN are, respectively, the weight
given to nontraded goods in production and the elasticity of substitution between
traded and nontraded goods.
7In turn, the consumption input of traded goods is a CES function of consumption
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,  C = n + κC. (7)
By analogy, the investment input of quality-adjusted traded goods is a CES function
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IFs




,  I = n + κI. (8)
0 <  C,  I < 1 are, respectively, the weights on the Home traded good in traded-
good inputs into consumption and investment. n is the proportion of the world’s
population living in the Home country. In this paper, we make the simplifying
assumption that the two countries are of equal size (n = 1
2). The parameters κC and
κI (0 <κ C,κ I < 1−n) determine the amount of local-good bias in the composition
of traded goods inputs into consumption and investment, respectively. (For example,
there is no local-good bias when κC = κI =0 ). We incorporate the empirically-based
assumption that the local-good bias is greater in consumption than in investment.
Traded investment inputs are referred to as ‘quality-adjusted’, because there are






















where the Qjs,j = H,F are ISP shocks that can be diﬀerent.19 If a Qjs increases,
a given physical unit of output of good j can contribute more to investment good
output (Js) than the same unit did before. IHs and IFs are measured in units of
Home and Foreign traded goods, respectively, whereas IHs and IFs are measured
in performance units. For example, IHs and IFs m i g h tb em e a s u r e di nn u m b e r s
of computers in which case IHs and IFs m i g h tb em e a s u r e di nt e r m so fc o m p u t i n g
power. Given that the Home traded good is the numeraire, the price of a unit of IHs
is unity. PFs is the price of the Foreign traded good in terms of the Home traded
good, and PHs and PFs are prices of Home and Foreign performance units in terms
of the Home traded good.
19The qualtity shocks are entered with the exponent 1−α
α so that if the Qjs are equal, doubling all
of them doubles steady-state outputs. More precisely, if Qjs = Qs,j= H,F,N,t h e nYis
Qs ,i= T,N
is constant in the nonstochastic steady state. In this paper we assume that QNs remains constant
at unity.
8Our ISP shocks are designed to generate eﬀects similar to those of an increase in
multifactor productivity in a separate ICT sector. The traded-goods sector can be
thought of as being divided into two sub-sectors–one producing investment inputs
that are subject to quality improvements and the other producing consumption inputs
that are not–with perfect mobility of capital and labor between the two subsectors.
Note that all of the ISP shocks aﬀect output of the investment good, which can be
used to increase the capital stock in both the traded and nontraded goods sectors.
Q shocks are reﬂected in the relative prices of investment goods. Using the model
results for sectoral prices and quantities, we can construct aggregate prices and quanti-
ties. In order to generate model results that are comparable to the data, we construct
chain-weighted aggregates. For example, for the relative price of investment, we use
the ratio of Fisher indices for the investment (Js)d e ﬂator and the GDP deﬂator,
where the deﬂator for Js is calculated using the prices of IHs, IFs,a n dINs and the
deﬂator for GDP is calculated using the prices of CHs, C∗
Hs, CNs, IHs, I∗
Hs,a n dINs
3.3 The Budget Constraint
The agent must also take into account a budget constraint. Income from production
of traded and nontraded goods plus interest from claims on Foreign last period must
be at least enough to cover purchases of both traded goods and the home nontraded
good for use in assembling consumption and investment plus claims on Foreign this
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PNs is the price of Home nontraded goods in term of Home traded goods. Rs is the
gross return on bonds denominated in the Home traded good. A positive value of Bs
i n d i c a t e sc l a i m so fH o m eo nF o r e i g n .
3.4 Relative Prices
In this paper, we focus on four relative prices. Two of them are the relative prices of
the two countries’ nontraded goods in terms of their traded goods represented by PNs
and P∗
Ns, respectively. An asterisk on a variable indicates that it relates to Foreign.









20Portfolio management costs are included to insure that the model has a well-deﬁned steady
state. Including these costs is the easiest among several roughly equivalent ways of guaranteeing
stationarity as explained by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
9where P∗
Cs is the price of the Foreign consumption bundle in terms of the Foreign
traded good. The TOT is deﬁn e da st h en u m b e ro fF o r e i g nt r a d e dg o o d si tt a k e st o
buy a unit of Home traded goods, so an increase is an improvement. The RER is the
CPI-adjusted exchange rate deﬁned as the number of Foreign consumption bundles
it takes to buy a Home consumption bundle, so an increase is an appreciation of
the Home currency in real terms. Improvements in the TOT and increases in PNs
cause the Home currency to appreciate in real terms but increases in P∗
Ns cause it to
depreciate. In the neighborhood of the steady state
d RERs = ν
³




+( 1− ν)(κC + κ
∗
C) d TOTs, (12)
where a hat over a variable indicates a percentage deviation from its steady-state
value. 0 <κ ∗




In this section we report the results of our simulations. To ﬁxi d e a s ,w eﬁrst discuss
symmetric increases in the levels of ISP in Home and Foreign. Then, we analyze
two types of persistent productivity growth shocks suggested by the data: symmetric
increases in ISP growth and (perfectly) asymmetric changes in MFP growth. The
values of the parameters used in the simulations are in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Unless stated otherwise, we assume that Home and Foreign parameters are identical.
In explaining our simulations, we use the terms ‘wealth eﬀect’ and ‘investment
incentive’. For us, a shock has a positive wealth eﬀect if it gives rise to an increase in
the excess of income over the spending needed to support the initial steady-state path
(both measured in Home traded goods). In calculating this excess, we hold constant
relative prices of physical units, consumption allocations, eﬀective investment input
allocations (IHs and IFs), and bond holdings.21 With MFP shocks, income goes up.
Agents receive the value of production of traded and nontraded goods through either
wages or capital income, and MFP shocks increase the amounts produced. With
ISP shocks, spending goes down. There is a fall in the relative price of eﬀective
traded-good investment inputs. When there are positive wealth eﬀects, agents can
consume more, increase the capital stock by more, or work less. What they choose
to do depends on the incentives they face.
A positive investment incentive can arise either because of a fall in the consump-
tion price of (quality-adjusted) investment or because of a rise in the marginal prod-
uct of capital.22 Changes in the consumption price of investment are associated with
21Since the initial excess is zero, the wealth eﬀect is given by the ﬁrst line of equation (10) minus
the second where XTs, XNs, Q
1−α
α
Hs ,a n dQ
1−α
α
Fs are at their post shock values and all other variables
are at their initial steady state values. Our deﬁnition of the term ‘wealth eﬀect’ is quite diﬀerent
from the one in Baxter (1995).
22For further discussion of the investment incentive see the Appendix.
10changes in the GDP price of investment in the same direction. We use the latter vari-
able and call it simply the ‘relative price of investment’. U.S. data for this relative
price are in F1.1.
4.1 Symmetric ISP Level Increases
In our ﬁrst experiment, there are symmetric permanent increases in the levels of ISP.
We compare results for two cases: (1) the identical (adjustment) costs case in which
adjusting capital-labor (K-L) ratios is costless in both countries (ψKL =0 ), and
(2) the higher Foreign (adjustment) costs case in which adjusting K-L ratios is very
costly in Foreign (ψ
∗
KL =5 0 0 0 ). In both cases, there are positive costs of adjusting
capital stocks that are the same in both countries.
In F2A and F2B, we show the eﬀects of 1% increases in the productivities of Home
and Foreign traded goods that are used as inputs in the assembly of investment goods
(QHs and QFs, respectively). Since these increases in the ISP of tradable investment
inputs are symmetric, they have the same positive wealth eﬀects in both countries in
both cases. In each country, it takes fewer resources to support the initial steady-state
path.
We use the case with identical costs (dashed lines) as a benchmark. In this case,
the two countries are completely symmetric, so all the eﬀects are the same in the two
countries. These results are similar to those for a closed economy in many respects.
It comes as no surprise that the shocks create positive investment incentives.
Before adjustment of consumption and investment, there are decreases in the relative
prices of investment. With optimal adjustment, the relative prices of investment
(F2A.1) fall by roughly 0.45%. The magnitudes of these declines reﬂect the fact that
tradables account for roughly half of investment inputs. After their initial drop, the
relative prices of investment remain roughly constant.
In our calibration, the costs of adjusting capital stocks are low enough that (gross)
investment shares (F2A.3) increase because quantity increases outweigh price declines.
The increases in investment shares by 0.09 pp must be matched by equal decreases
in consumption shares (F2A.4). The investment incentive is large enough relative
to the wealth eﬀect that there are decreases not only in the shares of consumption
but also in the chain-weighted levels (F2B.1). Although the shares of consumption
remain below baseline for twenty ﬁve years, the levels rise above baseline after four
years. The hump-shaped responses of consumption shares are due to the eﬀects of
habit in consumption. In each country, there are the same spikes in the excess of
(quality-adjusted) investment growth over GDP growth (F2A.2), labor productivity
growth (F2A.5), and GDP growth (F2A.7) as well as persistent increases in capital
deepening (F2A.6) and hours worked (F2A.8).
Now we turn to the case with higher Foreign costs (solid and dotted lines). Once
again, there are positive investment incentives in both countries. Before adjustment
of consumption and investment, the declines in the relative prices of investment are
the same. However, the positive investment incentive is larger in Home. The mar-
ginal product of capital is higher there because there are no K-L adjustment costs.
T h ei n i t i a li n c r e a s ei nt h eH o m ei n v e s t m e n ts h a r ei sa b o u tt w i c ea sg r e a ta si nt h e
11identical-costs case. About one third of this change is ﬁnanced by an additional re-
duction in the Home consumption share and the remaining two thirds by borrowing
from Foreign. As in the identical-costs case, the investment incentive eﬀect is large
enough relative to the wealth eﬀects that there are reductions not only in the share of
Home consumption but also in its the level. There is a major deterrent to increasing
investment further by borrowing more. Nontraded goods constitute a large share of
Home investment-assembly inputs and are complements to the other inputs, so either
the fall in consumption or the rise in work eﬀort would have to be relatively large.23
In contrast, in Foreign the investment incentive is small enough relative to the
wealth eﬀect that the investment share is reduced rather than increased. Given
that investment inputs are now much cheaper, Foreign residents can maintain their
capital stocks and even increase them a little, even though they drastically reduce
their investment share. They choose to devote the lion’s share of the freed resources
to increasing their consumption share because there is a relatively small increase in
the incentive to lend to Home.
In Home, there is some magniﬁcation of the eﬀects on the excess of investment
growth over GDP growth, labor productivity growth, GDP growth, capital deepen-
ing, and hours worked.24 However, in Foreign, there are signiﬁcant eﬀects on only
three of these variables: GDP growth, labor productivity growth, and hours. The
initial spike in labor productivity growth is larger in Foreign (0.14 pp) than in Home
(0.1 pp). Output growth increases somewhat less in Foreign, but hours remain vir-
tually unchanged there while they increase signiﬁcantly in Home. At ﬁrst, hours in
Foreign remain virtually unchanged because of the large cost of changing the capital-
labor ratio. Over time, total hours increase as a gradual increase in nontraded hours
(not shown) oﬀsets an even more gradual decrease in traded hours (not shown). Two
observations help in understanding why: (1) steady-state capital stocks increase in
Foreign as much as they do in Home and (2) nontraded investment inputs are com-
plements to traded inputs but do not beneﬁt from an improvement in ISP.
Home runs a trade balance deﬁcit (F2B.3) for about 5 years and a trade surplus
for many years thereafter. The higher level of investment in Home increases demand
for both tradable investment inputs. The increase in the trade deﬁcit as a share of
GDP is at its maximum (-.05 pp) initially when it is about a fourth of the total
increase in the Home investment share.
The Home TOT (F2B.4) remains roughly unchanged initially and then deterio-
rates slowly over time. At ﬁrst, the supply of and demand for traded goods (not
shown) are cut back by roughly equal amounts in Home and in Foreign. In Home, a
23We ﬁnd it natural to assume that nontraded goods are complements in the assembly of invest-
ment (and consumption) goods. In our simulations the elasticity of substitution between nontraded
and traded goods is one-half. Raising it to one has very small quantitative eﬀects. Raising it to
four (the value of the elasticity of substitution between the two traded goods) has large eﬀects at
the sectoral level and signiﬁcant but considerably smaller eﬀects at the aggregate level. It is more
attractive to use traded goods in both investment and consumption, so investment can be higher
without having consumption be any lower. At its peak the trade deﬁcit is 0.10 pp instead of 0.07
pp.
24Note that the initial decrease in capital deepening occurs because hours can increase in the
period of the shock, but the capital stock cannot.
12signiﬁcant amount of labor (not shown) is shifted from the traded to the nontraded
sector. However, almost immediately the supply of traded goods begins to increase
faster in Home because the Home traded-good capital stock increases much more
rapidly and because Home traded-good hours rebound rapidly. In each country, the
relative price of the nontraded goods (F2B.6), PN or P∗
N, rises by roughly the same
amount initially. It continues to rise in Foreign but begins to fall in Home because
of the divergent movements in consumption assembly, which is relatively intensive in
nontraded goods. Initially, the Home currency appreciates in real terms (F2B.5), and
equation (12) helps in understanding why. The RER rises a little initially because the
TOT improves, and the movements in the relative prices of nontraded goods oﬀset
each other. However, it begins to fall almost immediately because the eﬀects of the
divergent movements in the relative prices of nontraded goods reinforce those of the
d e t e r i o r a t i o ni nt h eTOT.
4.2 Symmetric ISP Growth Rate Increases
The data indicate that there was a persistent increase in MFP growth in the ICT
sector in the last half of the 1990s in both the U.S. and Europe. For this reason, it
is interesting to analyze persistent symmetric increases in the growth rates of ISP.
For simplicity, we restrict our attention to the more relevant case of asymmetric
adjustment costs. Like other analysts of persistent growth-rate shocks, we ﬁnd it
necessary to assume that agents must learn the process governing the growth rate
shocks in order to obtain results that bear some resemblance to the data.25 We
focus on the learning case and show results for the full-information case primarily for
purposes of exposition.
We assume that the Home ISP growth rate follows an AR(1) process:
˜ QHs =0 .95 ˜ QHs−1 + εHs, (13)
where a tilde over a variable indicates a growth rate. We set the coeﬃcient on the
lagged growth rate equal to 0.95 so that the relative price of investment (F3a.1)
decreases by one percent per year during the ﬁrst six years of the simulation (1996-
2001). This rate of decrease closely matches the one in the U.S. data. The process
for the Foreign ISP growth rate is analogous.
In the case with learning, agents hypothesize that ˜ QHs is the sum of a persistent
shock (SPs) and a temporary shock (STs) and that it evolves according to
˜ QHs = SPs+ STs,S Ps =0 .95SPs−1 + ePs,S Ts = eTs, (14)
where ePs and eTs are normally distributed innovations. Having observed ˜ QHs,t h e
agent infers SPs and STs using a Kalman ﬁlter. We assume that agents set the
autoregressive coeﬃcient for their hypothesized persistent process equal to the true
25Learning has been used in the analysis of productivity shocks by Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust
(2002) and Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2004).
13coeﬃcient.26 The ratio of the variances of ePs and eTs perceived by agents deter-
mines how long it takes them to learn. We choose this ratio so that the part of the
observed shock attributed to the persistent component is 75% after ﬁve years and
virtually 100% after ten years. The learning process for the Foreign ISP growth rate
is analogous.
We choose the ISP growth rate innovations (εHs for Home) so that they raise
the level of ISP by 1% in the ﬁrst period. That is, the ﬁrst-period eﬀects of the
ISP growth rate shocks on the levels of ISP are the same as those of the ISP level
shock considered in subsection 4.1. Scaling the shocks in this way makes it easy to
compare the initial eﬀects in the learning and full information cases. However, it
has the implication that the eﬀects of persistent growth rate shocks are an order of
magnitude larger because the ISP shocks asymptotically approach levels that are
13% higher than their preshock levels.
Just as in the case of increases in the levels of ISP,t h ew e a l t he ﬀects are the same
in both countries because the shocks are symmetric. However, the wealth eﬀects are
smaller in the benchmark case with learning than with full information because agents
are not sure that the shock is truly a persistent growth rate shock.
There are positive investment incentives in both countries, but the incentive in
Home is greater. The initial decreases in the relative prices of investment are the
same in both countries, but the marginal product of capital is higher in Home be-
cause there are no K-L adjustment costs. With optimal adjustment, the paths for
the relative prices of investment (F3A.1) in Home and Foreign are slightly diﬀerent
because investment demand increases by more in Home, limiting the price decline
to some extent. The increase in Home investment demand is reﬂected both in the
increase in the investment share (F3A.3) over time and in the rise in the excess of
investment growth over output growth (F3A.2) by about 0.5 pp for the ﬁrst 5 years.
As in the level shocks case, investment is attractive enough that there are decreases in
both the share (F3A.4) and the level (F3B.1) of consumption. Also, Home is induced
to borrow from Foreign. In contrast, Foreign residents reduce the share of investment
but increase the level of investment very gradually because of the high costs of ad-
justing K-L ratios. They increase the consumption share by somewhat less than they
decrease the investment share, and lend to Home.
In order to better understand the adjustment process in the learning case, it is
useful to consider the full information case. We show only the results for Home.
With full information, the wealth eﬀect is greater. Agents know full well that the
relative price of investment will be much lower in the future. For Home residents,
investment is unattractive enough initially that they cut the investment share (F3A.3)
by roughly 2 pp and the level of investment (F3B.2) by roughly 8%. The growth rate
of investment is temporarily below that of output (F3A.2). A little more than half
of the decrease in the investment share is used to raise the consumption share, and
the rest is lent to Foreign. We do not discuss the full information case any further,
except to note that in the early periods the paths for all the variables depart from
26If agents must also learn the coeﬃcient of the autoregressive process, they ﬁgure out the true
shock process much more slowly.
14those in the learning case in the manner implied by a larger perceived wealth eﬀect.
With learning, the response of the Home investment share in the ﬁrst period is a
weighted average of what the response would be for a persistent growth shock with
full information (-1.77 pp from F3A.2) and what it would be with a level shock (0.17
pp from F2A.2). Agents initially attribute only 6% of the observed movement in
ISP to the persistent component and the other 94% to a level shock. When these
percentages are used to weight the eﬀects of the two possible kinds of shocks, the
average eﬀect is 0.05 pp (F3A.3). Since the U.S. investment share did not fall in the
data when the rate of decline in the relative price of investment became larger, the
results with learning seem more plausible to us than those with full information.
Home labor productivity growth (F3A.5) increases on impact by 0.14 pp, roughly
the amount of the initial increase in ISP times the share in GDP of traded investment
inputs (Home and Foreign). As the large increase in investment raises the contribution
of capital deepening (F4A.6), labor productivity growth rises above its initial level.
In contrast, in Foreign there is essentially no contribution of capital deepening, so the
evolution of labor productivity growth closely matches that of the ISP shock.
In Home, hours (F4A.8) rise relatively rapidly and then fall back toward their
initial level. In Foreign, hours increase more slowly and reach a higher level.
The Home trade balance (F3B.3) is in deﬁcit for a time but then moves into sur-
plus. The Home TOT (F3B.4) deteriorate over time, making Home traded goods
relatively more attractive. The relative price of the nontraded good rises in Foreign
because consumption is intensive in nontraded goods. This rise reinforces the dete-
rioration in the Home TOT both of which cause the Home currency to depreciate in
real terms (F3B.4).
4.3 Asymmetric MFP Growth Rate Shocks
According to the data we report above, in the late 90s the U.S. experienced an increase
i nt h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fMFP in the non-ICT sector, and taken together European
countries experienced a reduction. In both regions, there were changes in several
sectors, some of which clearly produce nontraded goods. We perform simulations
designed to isolate the eﬀects of persistent changes in MFP growth rates.
For clarity, we make two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the
shocks are (perfectly) asymmetric by which we mean that the increase in Home and
the decrease in Foreign are equal in absolute value. Second, we assume that there are
no costs of adjusting K-L ratios in either Home or Foreign.27 We report responses
only for Home since with symmetric economic structures and asymmetric shocks,
Foreign responses are the exact opposites of Home responses.
As a benchmark, we take the case in which there are MFP shocks of equal mag-
nitude in the traded and nontraded sectors as suggested by the data. For compar-
ison, we also consider the more familiar case in which there are MFP shocks only
in the traded goods sector. This is the case used in discussions of the well-known
27Allowing for costs of adjusting K-L ratios in Foreign would make less diﬀerence in the case of
MFP growth shocks since capital deepening makes a smaller contribution to labor productivity
growth in this case.
15Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect. In both cases, we assume that agents face a learn-
ing problem with the same structure as the one described in Subsection 4.2. We also
discuss some of the diﬀerences between the results for MFP shocks and those for
ISP shocks.
In the benchmark case the MFP growth rate increases initially by 0.33 pp in both
the traded and nontraded sectors in Home (and declines by 0.33 pp in Foreign).28 We
have picked the size of the shocks so that the initial rise in Home labor productivity
growth matches the one in the simulation for a 1% ISP growth shock.29
There is a positive wealth eﬀect since the outputs of both traded and nontraded
goods increase. Before quantities adjust, there is no change in the relative price
of investment goods because MFP rises by the same proportion in the traded and
nontraded sectors. Nonetheless, there is still a positive investment incentive in Home
because the marginal products of capital rise in both sectors.
The positive investment incentive leads to increases in the Home investment share
(F4A.3) and in the excess of investment growth over GDP growth (F4A.2). At the
point at which it is the largest (0.8 pp), about half of the increase in the investment
share is ﬁnanced by a reduction in the consumption share (F4A.4), and the remainder
is ﬁnanced by borrowing from Foreign. Although the consumption share falls, the
wealth eﬀect is strong enough relative to the investment incentive that the level of
consumption rises steadily.
In the benchmark MFP case, the initial rise in Home labor productivity growth
(F4B.1, solid line) of roughly 0.2 pp reﬂects both the 0.33 pp increase in MFP
growth across the economy and labor’s share of income (0.7 pp). As MFP growth
subsides, labor productivity growth declines, and the contribution of capital deepen-
ing (F4A.6)–as opposed to the shock itself–accounts for a larger and larger share
of labor productivity growth.
For the ﬁrst several years, Home continues to borrow and run a trade-balance
deﬁcit (F4B.3). Since Home and Foreign traded goods are good substitutes, the
deterioration is substantial, as much as 0.5% of GDP in our baseline case. Since
there is local-good bias in both consumption and investment, the big initial increase
in home absorption results in a slight improvement in the terms of trade. However, as
Home production continues to expand, the Home terms of trade (F4B.4) deteriorate.
Now we turn to the more familiar case in which the MFP shock is concentrated
in the traded sector. We call this case the ‘traded-sector-only’ case and double the
magnitude of the shock since it aﬀects only one sector. The traded-sector-only case
is similar to the benchmark case in several ways. In Home there are a positive wealth
eﬀect and a positive investment incentive because the output of traded goods and the
marginal product of capital in the traded goods sector both rise.
However, there are some diﬀerences between the two cases. In the traded-sector-
only case, the path for the relative price of investment (F4A.1) is lower everywhere.
The reason is that investment assembly is more intensive in traded goods than con-
28As before, the AR(1) process governing the evolution of MFP growth has a coeﬃcient of 0.95.
29It is not surprising that with MFP s h o c k so ft h et y p ew ec o n s i d e r ,w ec a n n o tm a t c ht h ee n t i r e
path of labor productivity growth.
16sumption assembly.30 As a result, the investment share of GDP goes up by more.
Since the reduction in the consumption share (F4A.4) is about the same in both cases,
the higher investment share is reﬂected in more borrowing from Foreign accompanied
by more deterioration in the trade balance (F4B.3).
The most signiﬁcant diﬀerences from the benchmark case lie in the results for
some relative prices. The deterioration of the Home TOT (F4B.4) in the ﬁrst few
y e a r si sn o tv e r yd i ﬀerent from that in the benchmark case. In sharp contrast, the
relative price of the nontraded good (F4B.6) increases rapidly in Home (and falls
rapidly in Foreign) instead of remaining constant and is about 7% higher in the
long run. The large and divergent movements in the relative prices of nontraded
goods dominate movements in the TOT,s ot h eRER (F4B.5) rises in accordance
with equation (12). That is, in contrast to the benchmark case, the Home currency
appreciates dramatically in real terms, exemplifying the familiar Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson eﬀect.
Ac o m p a r i s o no ft h ee ﬀects of growth rate shocks for MFP with those of ISP
reveals some important diﬀerences. The MFP and ISP shocks we have chosen are
the ones suggested by our reading of the data, not those best suited for a head- to-
head comparison of the two kinds of shocks. Nonetheless, our simulations reveal some
salient diﬀerences between them.
T h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c e so ft h ew e a l t he ﬀect and the investment incentive are
opposite in the two cases. With MFP shocks, the relative strength of the wealth
eﬀect is great enough that the level of consumption rises from the outset. In contrast,
with ISP shocks, the wealth eﬀect is relatively weak, so the level of consumption falls
for some time.
The increase in labor productivity can be divided into the contribution of capital
deepening and the contribution of the shocks themselves.31 Capital deepening is
relatively less important with MFP shocks; that is, it accounts for a smaller fraction
of labor productivity growth. For instance, in year 2000 (4 years after the start of the
simulation) capital deepening accounts for one fourth of labor productivity growth
with MFP shocks (F4A.5 and F4A.6) as opposed to one half with ISP shocks (F3A.5
and F3A.6).
As stated above, we calibrate the shocks so that the initial change in labor pro-
ductivity growth is the same for MFP and for ISP shocks. Given this normalization
and our calibration of the parameters, for example, the trade balance deteriorates
more with the MFP shocks.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Our analysis highlights the major diﬀerence between positive ISP and MFP shocks.
Both shocks lead to marked increases in labor productivity growth. However, with
ISP shocks, raising labor productivity growth requires much more investment. In-
30In our calibration, the traded shares for investment and consumption are 0.48 and 0.37, respec-
tively.
31See the Appendix.
17creases in labor productivity are accounted for more by increases in capital deepening
than by the shock itself. This ﬁnding supports the view that ISP shocks played a
relatively more important role than MFP shocks in generating the persistent excess
of investment growth over GDP growth in the U.S. in the late 1990s.
Lags in recognition are key in explaining our results for persistent growth shocks.
Under full information, with positive ISP shocks investment falls initially and remains
below its initial level for a few years. Agents postpone investment because they realize
that the price of investment goods will be even lower in the future. With learning, our
simulation results are closer to the observed outcomes: investment remains constant
initially but rises immediately thereafter.
We conﬁrm that the treatment of nontraded goods can make a big diﬀerence.32
I nt h ec a s eo fISP shocks, changing the degree of substitutability between traded
and nontraded goods has large eﬀects at the sectoral level. In the case of MFP
shocks, we can reproduce the conventional Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson result: when
a country experiences a positive shock that aﬀects only traded goods, its currency
appreciates in real terms and its trade balance deteriorates, changes like those that
occurred in the U.S. in the late 1990s. However, the data suggest that real-life MFP
shocks also aﬀected nontraded goods. Our model implies that such shocks should
have virtually no eﬀect on the RER and that they should generate a smaller trade
balance deterioration.
Our simulations provide some insights regarding the eﬀects of observed produc-
tivity shocks. However, it is not surprising that they leave some features of the data
unaccounted for. We use a two-country model. But it seems clear that a model with
more regions, almost certainly including a separate East Asia bloc, is required to
analyze some of the developments of the 1990s, such as the big increase in the U.S.
trade account deﬁcit–accompanied by little increase in the bilateral trade surplus
of Europe with the U.S.–and the large real appreciation of the dollar. We consider
only productivity shocks. But other important shocks inﬂuenced economic outcomes
in the 1990s. A prime example is the Asian crisis.
32Like many others, we assume that the dividing line between traded and nontraded goods is
exogenous. There is a clear need for more research on endogenous tradability. An early contribution
is Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977), and recent contributions include Bergin and Glick
(2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2004). The outsourcing abroad of record keeping and customer
service functions is a familiar concrete example.
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Lagrangian Expression for Home Agent
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where ΛTs, ΛNs, ΛJs,a n dΛCs are the shadow prices of KTs, KNs, J = JTs + JNs,
and income.
Parameter Values
The parameter values used in the simulations are given in Table A1. In the initial
steady state PF, PN, P∗
N, QT, Q∗
T, XT, XN, X∗
T, and X∗
N are all unity.
Table A1: Parameter Values
β discount factor 0.98
γ elasticity of marginal utility w.r.t. V 1.0
α share of capital in production 0.35
δ depreciation rate 0.025
φ governs capital adjustment costs 0.2
νC & νI share of nontraded goods in C & I 0.63 & 0.52
1/θCN elasticity of substitution - T & N goods in C 0.5
1/θIN elasticity of substitution - T & N goods in J 0.5
n relative size of home country 0.5
κC local-good bias in CT 0.32
κI local-good bias in IT 0.08
1/θCT elasticity of substitution - H & F goods in CT 4.0
1/θIT elasticity of substitution - H & F goods in IT 4.0
ψKL & ψ
∗
KL governs capital-labor ratio adjustment costs 0 & 5000
ζ governs portfolio management costs 0.0001
2/χ Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.4
χ0 set so steady-state share of time worked is 0.33 0.719
19Decomposing Labor Productivity Growth
In this section, we show that the usual decomposition of labor productivity growth
into a contribution from capital deepening and a contribution from a productivity
s h o c ki sa sr e l e v a n tf o rISP shocks as it is for MFP shocks. For simplicity, we focus
on a special case in which all goods are traded, but the argument generalizes.
The Törnqvist index for quality-adjusted, chain-weighted output growth, which
approximates the Fisher index, is given by
˜ Y CW


















Ht are chain-weighted output, consumption exports, and in-
vestment exports, respectively, and, for example SCHt is the average of the shares of
the consumption of the Home good in total output in periods t and t − 1.33
Quality-adjusted output at constant prices (Y CP
t )a n di t sg r o w t hr a t e(˜ Y CP
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where in the initial steady state Qt =1 ,a n d ,f o re x a m p l e ,SCHt = SCH.F r o m
equations (15) and (17), it is clear that growth of GDP at constant prices can be
viewed as the ﬁrst-order approximation of the Törnqvist index with no trend growth
since ˜ CHt = ˜ C∗
Ht = ˜ IHt + 1−α
α ˜ QHt = ˜ I∗
Ht + 1−α
α ˜ QHt =0in the steady state.
Log-linearizing and combining equation (16) and the technology constraint
CH + C
∗








t ,( 1 8 )
yield the usual decomposition in terms of percent deviations from the steady state:
ˆ Y CP
t − ˆ Lt = α
³
ˆ Kt − ˆ Lt
´
+( 1− α) ˆ XHt +( ShIH + ShIH∗) 1−α
α ˆ QHt. (19)
From equation (19), it is clear that the ISP shock ( ˆ Qt) can be interpreted as an
MFP shock that aﬀects only the investment-producing sector of the economy.
Deﬁning the Investment Incentive
For us, a positive investment incentive arises for one of two reasons. The ﬁrst
reason is a decrease in the relative price of investment. Under perfect competition,
prices equal marginal costs, so this relative price equals the ratio of marginal costs,
MCIt
MCCt,w h e r eMCIt and MCCt are obtained from the cost minimization problems
min
IHt,INt,IFt
IHt + PNtINt+ PFtIFt+ MCIt[J(QHtIHt,Q FtIFt,I Nt,) − J0)], (20)
min
CHt,CNt,CFt
CHt + PNtCNt+ PFtCFt+ MCCt[C(CHt,C Nt,C Ft) − C0)]. (21)
J(·) and C(·) are the CES aggregators (6) and (5), and J0 and C0 are the pre-shock
levels of quality-adjusted investment and consumption. Positive ISP shocks lower
the relative price of investment. The second reason is an increase in the marginal
product of capital. Positive MFP shocks raise the marginal product of capital.
33Dumagan (2002) shows the relationship between the Törnqvist index and the Fisher ideal index
used in computing chain-weighted GDP by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
20References
B a c k u s ,D . ,P .K e h o e ,a n dF .K y d l a n d( 1 9 9 4a) “Dynamics of the Trade Balance and
t h eT e r m so fT r a d e :T h eJC u r v e ? ” ,American Economic Review, 84, 84—103.
Backus, D., P. Kehoe, and F. Kydland (1994b) “Relative Price Movements in Dy-
namic General Equilibrium Models of International Trade”, in F. van der Ploeg
(ed.) The Handbook of International Macroeconomics, Blackwell, Oxford.
Baxter, M. (1995) “International Trade and Business Cycles”, in G. Grossman and
K. Rogoﬀ (eds.) Handbook of International Economics,V o l u m e3 ,E l s e v i e r ,A m s -
terdam, 1801—1864.
Baxter, M., and M. J. Crucini (1995) “Business Cycles and the Asset Structure of
Foreign Trade”, International Economic Review, 36, 821—854.
Bergin, P. R., and R. Glick (2003) “Endogenous Tradability and Macroeconomic Im-
plications”, NBER Working Paper 9739, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bosworth, B. P., and J. E. Triplett (2000) “What’s New About the New Economy?
IT, Economic Growth, and Productivity”, processed, Brookings Institution.
Dornbusch, R., S. Fischer, and P. A. Samuelson (1977) “Comparative Advantage,
Trade, and Payments in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods”, Amer-
ican Economic Review, 67, 823—839.
Dumagan, J. C. (2002) “Comparing the Superlative Törnqvist and Fisher Ideal In-
dexes”, Economic Letters, 76, 251—58.
Edge, R. M., T. Laubach, and J. C. Williams (2003) “The Responses of Wages and
Prices to Technology Shocks”, Finance and Economics Discussion Papers 2003-65,
Federal Reserve Board.
Edge, R. M., T. Laubach, and J. C. Williams (2004) “Learning and Shifts in Long-
Run Productivity Growth”, Finance and Economics Discussion Papers 2004-21,
Federal Reserve Board.
Erceg, C. J., L. Guerrieri, and C. Gust (2002) “Productivity Growth and the Trade
Balance in the 1990s: the Role of Evolving Perceptions”, processed, Federal Re-
serve Board.
Fernald, J. G., and S. Ramnath (2004) “The Acceleration in U.S. Total Factor Produc-
tivity After 1995: The Role of Information Technology”, Economic Perspectives,
1, 52—67.
GGDC (2004) “60-Industry Database”, Groningen Growth and Development Center,
(www.ggdc.net).
Ghironi, F., and M. J. Melitz (2004) “International Trade and Macroeconomic Dy-
namics with Heterogenous Firms”, processed, Harvard.
21Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz, and P. Krusell (1997) “Long-Run Implications of
Investment-Speciﬁc Technological Change”, American Economic Review, 87, 342—
362.
Hunt, B., and A. Rebucci (2003) “The U.S. Dollar and the Trade Deﬁcit: What
Accounts for the Late 1990s?”, processed, International Monetary Fund.
Inklar, R., M. O’Mahony, K. Robinson, and M. Timmer (2003) “Productivity and
Competitiveness in the EU and in the U.S.”, in M. O’Mahony and B. van Ark
(eds.) EU Productivity and Competitiveness: An Industry Perspective Can Europe
Resume the Catching-up Process?,O ﬃce for Oﬃcial Publications of the European
Communities, Luxembourg, 73—147 (www.ggdc.net).
Jorgenson, D. W. (2004) “Accounting fo rG r o w t hi nt h eI n f o r m a t i o nA g e ” ,i n
P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds.) Handbook of Economic Growth,N o r t hH o l l a n d ,
Amsterdam, forthcoming (http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/
papers/papers.html).
Kollmann, R. (1998) “U.S. Trade Balance Dynamics: the Role of Fiscal Policy and
Productivity Shocks and of Financial Market Linkages”, Journal of International
Money and Finance, 17, 637—669.
Laxton, D., and P. Pesenti (2003) “Monetary Rules for Small, Open, Emerging
Economies”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 1109—1146.
O l i n e r ,S .D . ,a n dD .E .S i c h e l( 2 0 0 0 )“ T h eR e s u r g e n c eo fG r o w t hi nt h eL a t e1 9 9 0 s :
Is Information Technology the Story?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives,1 4 ,
3—22.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004) “STAN Database”,
(www.oecd.org/sti/stan).
Schmitt-Grohe, S., and M. Uribe (2003) “Closing Small Open Economy Models”,
Journal of International Economics, 61, 163—185.
Schreyer, P. (2001) Measuring Productivity,O E C D .
Stockman, A., and L. Tesar (1995) “Tastes and Technology in a Two-Country Model
of the Business Cycle: Explaining International Comovements”, American Eco-
nomic Review, 85, 168—185.
22